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There is something really exciting and intriguing about Husserl's phe-
nomenological philosophy. In his works one reads about a newly discovered
land, an \innite eld of transcendental experience", ready to be explored.1
It is the promised land that philosophers since long have been searching for
in their pursuit of true knowledge. It is a place in which the essences of
things reveal themselves in pure self-evidence, a place made of certainty.
And the best part: it is already there, freely available in the immediacy of
one's own consciousness.
I am not trying to ridicule Husserl here. To the contrary, intuitively I
resonate with much of what he has to say. The phenomenological method,
in particular the so-called `phenomenological reduction', his emphasis on
intentionality, and the underlying philosophical motivations that are related
to it; they seem to me to make up a beautifully coherent and convincing
story. However, when I think Husserl's phenomenological theory through,
certain worries enter my mind that concern whether or not phenomenology
can really live up to its promises.
In this paper I want to address the place of truth and realism in Husserl's
phenomenology. Truth and realism were important underlying motivations
for Husserl in the development of his phenomenological framework. How-
ever, I believe that ultimately these two notions are essentially problematic
from Husserl's phenomenological perspective.
First I will explain the notions of truth and realism, in particular how
Husserl conceived of them. Secondly, I will introduce Husserl's notion of
`absolute givenness' and his method of `phenomenological reduction'. I will
propose that the idea of absolute givenness is of crucial importance to the
notions of truth and realism as conceived by Husserl. Then, in the third
section, I will try to show that Husserl's theory of intentionality ultimately
renders this notion of absolute givenness deeply problematic. Consequently,
truth and realism collapse.2 I will nish with a short concluding remark.
1(Husserl, 1960, p. 31)
2I don't claim that my interpretation of Husserl's account of intentionality, and his
phenomenological framework in general, is the only possible one. My only contention is
that if we understand phenomenology in the way that I will present it (an interpretation
that I take to be plausible), then it will have important (and devastating) repercussions
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I. Truth, realism, and Husserl's phenomenological
motivations
Husserl understands his phenomenology to be a perfection and completion of
the Cartesian project of nding an absolute grounding of knowledge (Husserl,
1960). It is therefore not controversial to say that his motivations are mainly
epistemological. Husserl talks about the foundational crises of the natural
sciences and the absence of any \objectively valid results" in philosophy
(Husserl, 1960, p. 5). His phenomenological system can be seen as a response
to these issues.
How does Husserl conceive of the idea of grounding knowledge abso-
lutely, and how does he think we can arrive at such a ground? In the rst
meditation of the Cartesian Meditations Husserl elaborates extensively on
these questions. One very important demand in the search for absolute
grounds, according to Husserl, is that we should start without any philo-
sophical presuppositions whatsoever. Indeed, we might not even presuppose
the possibility of an absolute grounding. But then how is any progress to be
made?
According to Husserl we should rst look at the idea of `grounding some-
thing' itself. Basing himself on the de facto practices of the sciences of his
day, he states that `grounding' ultimately means that we base our judgments
on evidence. Husserl explains `evidence' as a \mental seeing of something
itself" (Husserl, 1960, p. 12). Moreover, the evidence proper to a philosoph-
ical grounding of knowledge must be \apodictic and rst in itself" (Husserl,
1960, p. 14-16). This means for Husserl (as it also did for Descartes) that
philosophy should rst nd something that is \absolutely given" and as such
\indubitable".
Two important metaphysical notions that seem to play in the back-
ground of Husserl's phenomenological project are (1) truth as correspon-
dence, and (2) realism. For example, in Investigation VI of Logical Inves-
tigations vol. 2 Husserl characterizes truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus,
which means that truth consists in the agreement between thought and ob-
ject (Husserl, 2001a, p. 260-261). Also, as we will see, phenomenology con-
sist mainly of phenomenological descriptions. And naturally, descriptions
are supposed to be capable of being more or less adequate to what they
describe. Consequently, phenomenological descriptions ought to be capable
of being qualied as true or false.
The idea that Husserl is a realist might be less immediately obvious. This
is mainly because realism is usually understood to stand for the metaphysical
doctrine that says that objects exist materially and independent from the
mind, and this doctrine is, as we shall see, quite foreign to Husserl's thought.
However, in the present context I will understand realism along Dummettian
for the notions of truth, realism, and the possibility of phenomenology.
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lines (Dummett, 1978): i.e. realism is a position one takes with respect
to a certain class of entities. Further, and more importantly, statements
about the class of entities about which one is a realist are characterized by
bivalence. This means that statements about the class of entities are either
true or false independently from how we think or describe these entities. In
this sense then, I take Husserl to be a realist about ideal entities, and more
importantly, the phenomenological data of phenomenological descriptions.3
In the remainder of this paper I will try to show why I think the no-
tions of truth and realism, two notions that on the present account are
obviously closely related together, are problematic within a Husserlian phe-
nomenological framework. Although truth and realism seem to be two of
the main forces behind Husserl's phenomenological project, the very nature
of Husserl's phenomenological framework renders them deeply problematic.
II. Absolute givenness and the phenomenological
reduction
In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl states that the \rst methodological
principle" of philosophy is that, in the search for an absolute grounding of
knowledge, we may not accept or adhere to any assertion that is not derived
from evidence (Husserl, 1960, p. 13). More specically, the evidence that
we are looking for must, in a Cartesian fashion, be absolutely given and as
such be indubitable.
To understand how Husserl conceives of the notions of `absolute given-
ness' and `indubitable', it will be helpful if we pay a quick thought to
Descartes methodological doubt in the Meditations on First Philosophy.
Descartes famously argues that although he can doubt the existence of the
world, he is absolutely certain of his own existence as a thinking thing. Now
although Husserl is really not concerned which such existential problems,
he does recognize in the ego the \ultimate and apodictically certain basis
for judgments" (Husserl, 1960, p. 18). However, he does something very
dierent with it.
Husserl not only thinks that the bare `I AM' of the ego is absolutely given,
he also thinks that the entire realm of conscious experience can be disclosed
as something that is indubitably and absolutely given. Just as Descartes
showed that we may doubt this or that, but that the fact of doubting itself
cannot coherently by doubted, Husserl states that a similar principle holds
for all conscious acts:
3In (Moran, 2008) we read: \Husserl Husserl maintained a robustly realist view of
truth". He then cites Husserl: \What is true is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one
and the same, whether men or not-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it." (Husserl,
2001b, p. 79)
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However I might perceive, imagine, judge, infer { whether these
acts are attended by certainty or uncertainty, whether they actu-
ally have objects or not { it remains absolutely clear and certain
that with respect to perception I am perceiving this or that, that
with respect to judgment, I am judging this or that, etc. (...) Ev-
ery intellectual experience, indeed every experience whatsoever,
can be made into an object of pure seeing and apprehension while
it is occurring. And in this act of seeing it is an absolute given-
ness. (Husserl, 1999, p. 23-24) (Italics from the original text).
Simply put, although one might on a giving occasion doubt whether
what one sees is really there or not, or more drastically, whether there is
any external world at all, it is at least certain that one seems to see and
that there seems to appear a world to us in conscious experience. In so far
as we conne ourselves entirely to what actually is present in consciousness,
we will have an \innite realm of being of a new kind" (Husserl, 1960, p.
27) that can function as the absolute ground of all knowledge.
However, according to Husserl a denite change of attitude is needed in
order for consciousness phenomena to reveal themselves to us in their ab-
solute givenness. This change of attitude is aected by what Husserl calls
the `phenomenological reduction'. The aim of the phenomenological reduc-
tion is to exclude from our theorizing everything that is not immanently
given to conscious experience itself, but is rather `transcendent' to it. Most
importantly, what needs to be excluded is (1) all suppositions concerning
the (non)-existence of the external or natural world, and (2) all suppositions
about how the conscious phenomena under investigation might or might not
themselves be a function of an individual organism in the natural world. In
connection to this Husserl also emphasizes that phenomenology is not a
species of descriptive psychology. Let me explain these points in a little
more detail.
In Ideas Husserl states that whereas in the `natural attitude' one is solely
concerned with matters of fact, facts whose reality are contingent, one is in
the `phenomenological attitude' solely concerned with `essences' whose ideal
reality is necessary (Husserl, 1982, p. xx - 8).4
From within the `natural attitude' it seems quite natural to conceive
of the conscious phenomena that enter our consciousness from moment to
moment as merely contingent occurrences. It is surely conceivable that,
at his very moment, one could have been in another environment having
dierent experiences. And indeed, in so far as conscious phenomena are
the primary data for the phenomenologist, it might seem strange at rst
4Husserl himself talks about essences as irreal. However, he means by this that essences
do not exist spatio-temporaly. Yet he would nevertheless consider them `real' in the sense
that he is a realist about them (in the sense of realism that I have stipulated in the rst
section).
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that Husserl thinks that the phenomenologist is nevertheless able to deal
with `universal essences' only. According to Husserl however, the contingent
mental phenomena that enter our minds precisely reveal themselves, after
the performance of the phenomenological reduction, as the very essences of
things themselves.
To understand how Husserl thinks this works, consider the following
passages from The Idea of Phenomenology :
I have a particular intuition of red; I attend to pure immanence
alone; I perform the phenomenological reduction. I separate o
anything that red might signify that might lead one to apperceive
it as transcendent, as, say, the red of a piece of blotting paper
on my desk, and the like. (...) If we in fact do this in a pure act
of seeing, would it still make sense to doubt what red in general
is, what is meant by \red", what it is according to its essence?
We see it { there it is; there is what we mean, this species red.
Could a divine being, an innite intellect, do anything more to
grasp the essence of red than to see it as a universal? (Husserl,
1999, p. 42)
Andrew Bell claries this idea through a comparison with Frege (Bell,
1999). Frege distinguishes between the semantic sense of a proposition and
the actual act of asserting its truth. Although a proposition might be true
or false, and is usually with respect to its truth-value contingent, it's sense
is independent from its actual truth value. In this sense we could say that
a propositional content has its own xed meaning independent from how
the world actually is, indeed that it has its content independent from the
existence of any world at all. But, and this is important, this does not mean
that no reference is being made to an actual world; that such reference is
not part of the content of the proposition. To the contrary, propositions
essentially make reference to the world. However, from the fact that a
proposition purports to refer in this a way, it does not follow that it must
automatically be true. Consequently, we can consider propositional contents
independently from their actual truth values.
According to Husserl, when we perform the phenomenological reduction
we abstract from the fact that the contents of consciousness are contin-
gent and may, above all, not even refer to anything existing objectively.
Instead, after the phenomenal reduction, we are solely concerned with con-
scious phenomena qua ideal contents, i.e. eidetic essence.5 Again however,
and importantly, the external world may still be part of the contents that
the phenomenologist is investigating.6 However, he does not pass judgments
about their contingent truth-value as (possibly non-existing) matters of fact.
5See also e.g. (Husserl, 1960, p. 27-28)
6See also (Zahavi, 2004) for discussion.
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Another important feature of these contents is that they are essentially
intentional. That is, they essentially involve references to conscious acts such
as perceiving, remembering, thinking, wishing etc. And as I have already
said earlier, such intentional acts are according to Husserl themselves abso-
lutely given and indubitable. Because these contents are entirely immanent
to consciousness, and absolutely given, they provide the phenomenologist
with the primary data for his phenomenological descriptions.
In this way then Husserl attempts to have established realism (in the
sense specied in the rst section) and the possibility of truth as adaequatio
rei et intellectus. Realism is established because the phenomenological data
are simply and absolutely given (which means that they are what they are
independent of how we think of them or describe them). And the possibility
of truth is ascertained because of the correspondence between phenomeno-
logical descriptions and intentional contents. However, as I have already
said, I believe there are certain diculties with Husserl's phenomenological
approach to realism and truth. And I believe this is a direct consequence of
his account of intentional acts.
III. Husserl's account of intentional acts and the
process of phenomenological description
According to Husserl, the grounding of knowledge must proceed from the in-
tentional acts that make up consciousness. Indeed Husserl thinks that even
the `transcendent' notion of the external ultimately wholly derives its sense
from these intentional acts: \Anything belonging to the world, any spa-
tiotemporal being, exists for me...in that I experience it, perceive it, rememe-
ber it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like."
(Husserl, 1960, p. 21). Ultimately, such concepts as `knowledge', `truth',
`being' also reveal themselves as having an intentional/phenomenological ori-
gin (Bell, 1999, p. 142). But how does Husserl conceive of these intentional
acts?
A fundamental feature of Husserl's account of intentionality is that inten-
tional acts are a priori directed at specic objects, and that these objects
qua intentional objects are immanently present to the acts themselves in
virtue of the way the acts direct themselves, see e.g. (Husserl, 2001c, p.
235) and (Husserl, 1982, p. 74)). In other words, for a specic object to be
intentionally immanent to some act, is for that act to direct itself to that
object. Moreover, the fact that the act has its particular object immanent
to it is wholly independent from the actual existence of that object. To be
sure, consider the following passage form the Shorter Logical Investigations:
I have an idea of the god Jupiter: this means that I have a cer-
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tain presentative experience, the presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter
is realized in my consciousness. (...)...it does not exist at all. This
does not prevent our-idea-of-the-god-Jupiter from being actual,
a particular sort of experience or particular mode of minded-
ness (Zumutesein), such that he who experiences it may rightly
say that the mythical king of the gods is present to him, con-
cerning whom there are such and such stories. If, however, the
intended object exists, nothing becomes phenomenologically dif-
ferent. (Husserl, 2001c, p. 216)
Andrew Bell gives a good characterization of Husserl's account of in-
tentionality when he characterizes it as `adverbial ' (Bell, 1999, 117). For
example, a thought's being directed at the god Jupiter could be reformu-
lated as an instance of `thinking Jupiter-ly' (to use Husserl's terminology;
each of these acts constitute a `particular mode of mindedness'). Similarly,
the objects p, q, and, r are immanently present in the intentional acts of
`remembering p-ly', `seeing q-ly', and `imagining r-ly'. In other words, the
intentional objects that are immanent to consciousness are wholly deter-
mined by the way they are being directed to.
Now I believe that if this is indeed the way we should understand Husserl's
account of intentionality, the supposition of absolute givenness might turn
out to be rather problematic. And consequently, the same goes for the no-
tions of realism and truth that depend on it. Let me explain why I think
this is so.
To get to where I want to go, let me rst draw attention to a treat-
ment by David Cerbone (Cerbone, 2012) of certain skeptical worries that
concern the possibility of assessing phenomenological descriptions for ade-
quacy. Cerbone distinguishes two kinds of skepticism. The rst of these is
an epistemological skepticism. The idea here is that because the phenomenal
contents of consciousness are in such a constant ux, the phenomenologist
is never able to really compare his descriptions with the phenomena that he
intended to describe. Consequently, he can never really know whether or
not his description adequate.
The second kind of skepticism is ontological. It hold that the absolute
givenness to which the phenomenologist appeals to might actually not exist.
In other words, there might simply not be any fact of the matter when it
comes to the issue of whether the phenomenologists descriptions are ade-
quate or not. The descriptions that the phenomenologist comes up with
might simply be nothing more than a reection of the beliefs that the phe-
nomenologist happens to have about his conscious states. Consequently,
there is nothing that, as it were, `backs up' these believes (i.e. there is
literally no `Gegenstand').
Note that the rst of these skeptical worries relates to the problem of
assuring phenomenological truth, and that the second concerns the ques-
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tion of realism. Now Cerbone responds to these worries by saying that
ultimately they are not relevant to phenomenology. The reason he oers is
that such questions really point to the kind of existential concerns that the
phenomenological reduction is precisely designed to eliminate. Recall that
the phenomenologist is not concerned with questions such as whether the
external world really exists. Instead, from the phenomenological point of
view the only interest is in the external world as a phenomenon appearing
to consciousness. Therefore, it would be a mistake to ask whether the phe-
nomenologists descriptions correspond to what the phenomena in question
`really' are, for it would then treat of phenomena as objectively existing
realities.
Although Cerbone is right in saying that phenomenology is not concerned
with `objective existing realities', I think that his defense is entirely besides
the point. For the problem of realism here is not about whether or not
intentional acts exist as objective spatiotemporal individuals, but whether
they are indeed absolutely given in the way that Husserl requires them. To
be sure, I have dened realism as a position that one takes to a certain class
of entities. More specically, being a realist about a certain class of entities
means that one holds the conviction that when it comes to propositions
about the entities in question, there is a fact of the matter that determines
whether these propositions are true or not. It is precisely in this sense
that Husserl is to be counted as a realist. After all, the very notion of
description already essentially involves the notion of adequacy. And because
it is ultimately on account of what is absolutely given that descriptions are
either adequate or not, Husserl's realism ultimately depends on the reality
of this absolute givenness.
Now I want to argue that the whole notion of absolute givenness is
incompatible with Husserl's account of intentionality. The rst question we
ought to ask is: how can anything be absolutely given in consciousness if
what is absolutely given is essentially an intentional construct? According to
Husserl's theory of intentionality, the object of an intentional act is entirely
determined by the way consciousness directs itself to it through intentional
act. And this seems incompatible with the supposition that intentional
contents are simply given.7
Of course Husserl should respond to this and say that, indeed, it is not
the object that is absolutely given but the intentional act that is directed at
it. Phenomenology is about giving descriptions of intentional acts (together
with the objects that they determine), but not about the objects in so far
as they are separate from these intentional acts. However, I think that the
absolute givenness of the intentional acts themselves is also more problematic
than it seems. The reason is that as soon the phenomenologist `directs his
regard' (Husserl, 1960, p. 53) to these intentional acts, they themselves
7See also (Bell, 1999, p. 183-184)
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become intentional objects. In other words, as soon as the phenomenologist
`directs his regard' to the intentional acts themselves, the acts themselves are
immediately shaped by themanner in which the phenomenologist is directed
at them. In this way, the supposed absolute givenness of intentional acts
turns out to be highly questionable. To what extent can the phenomenologist
assure himself that his phenomenological descriptions are anything more
than the result of pure confabulation?8
At several passages Husserl seems to be aware of this problem. For
example, in the second meditation of Cartesian Meditations he deals with
the issue that `transcendental reection' (i.e. the process by which we direct
our regard to the intentional acts themselves) modies the phenomenological
data that is being reected on (Husserl, 1960, p. 33).9 But his response to
this is, I think, quite problematic: \Therewith, to be sure, an essentially
changed subjective process takes the place of the original one; accordingly it
must be said that this reection alters the original subjective process. But
that is true of every reection, including natural reection" (Husserl, 1960,
p. 34). In other words, we should not worry too much about this issue, for it
is only natural for acts of reection to modify what they are directed upon.
However, I take it to be obvious that this allowance is ultimately devastating
to the demand that the phenomenologist should base his descriptions on
what is absolutely given.
Lastly, Husserl seems to think that it is possible for the phenomenologist
to take the position of a \disinterested onlooker", and he conceives of this
as an act whereby the ego \splits" himself from his intentional processes
(Husserl, 1960, p. 35). However, I serious doubt if this is really possible.
In any case, I would not know how to accomplish such a state. As long
as I am aware of my mental life, I am actively engaged with it. Again,
to be reexively aware of ones mental life is itself an intentional act, and
therefore something active. But even if it were possible to take the position
of disinterested onlooker, how would it be possible to actually derive from
it a phenomenological description? Must not an act of cognition precede
such a description? To be a disinterested onlooker is simply a thought that
one thinks, and not an actual state of being. In any case, the idea that
intentional acts can themselves be absolutely given to the phenomenologist
turns out to be highly problematic.
Now if indeed the whole notion of absolute givenness might as well be a
mere ction, it seems that, within a phenomenological framework, the same
must be said about truth and realism. First of all, if there is no such thing
as absolute givenness in the phenomenological realm, then there is `fact
8Andrew Bell puts the points nicely: In the last analysis, all that a rigorous scientist
may do is describe his own intuitions; and the dogmatism and subjectivity inherent in
this proposal is not in the least mitigated by the fact that those intuitions are supposed
to strike him as self-evident intuitions of essence." (Bell, 1999, p. 197)
9See also e.g. (Husserl, 1982, p. 181-190)
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of the matter' that can account for the actual adequacy of a phenomeno-
logical description. Indeed, there seems to be nothing left to distinguish
phenomenological description from mere confabulation. Secondly, because
there is nothing that enable adequacy, Husserl's conception of truth as adae-
quatio rei et intellectus also collapses.
IV. Concluding remarks
I have tried to give reasons for the idea that the kind of absolute givenness
to which Husserl appeals to might in fact be rather problematic. As I have
tried to show, this seems to be a direct consequence of his `adverbial' theory
of intentionality, which holds that intentional objects are essentially deter-
mined by the acts that are directed to them. Because Husserl's account of
truth and his realism precisely depend on this notion of absolute givenness,
the question is what remains of Husserl's phenomenological project. After
all, the preservation of truth and realism are two of the main motivations
behind this project. To solve this issue, I believe there are two options. The
rst is to try to show that absolute givenness is possible after all. However,
this would seem to require a very dierent theory of intentionality (and,
again, I don't claim that my interpretation is the only possible one). The
second option is to give dierent interpretations of the notions of truth and
realism within a Husserlian phenomenological framework. Perhaps, an in-
tersubjective theory of truth, based on phenomenological consensus, might
do the trick. In fact, Husserl seemed to have hinted at this approach himself
(Bell, 1999, p. 226-232). Possibly such an approach is able to save phe-
nomenology as a philosophically fruitful discipline. However, in any case I
believe the most attractive features of phenomenology will be lost.
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